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Summary of Existing Published Work 
 
Introduction, Aims & Methodology 
At its broadest level, my book The Handbook of Social Media and the Law,  considers the 
array of overlapping DQGH[LVWLQJOHJLVODWLRQWKDWVHHNVWRµJRYHUQ¶VRFLDOPHGLDSODWIRUPVDQG
social media users, analysing from both criminal and civil perspectives the laws that regulate 
the way in which stakeholders are able to interact with social media.  
 
In my book, I analyse the law doctrinally and offer a contemporary analysis of social media 
as an ever-VKLIWLQJ³ODZVFDSH´ZKLFKFRQWLQXDOO\SUHVHQWVUHJXODWRU\FKDOOHQJHV'UDZLQJRQ
this this systematic doctrinal analysis, I have subsequently been able to consider from a 
theoretical and conceptual perspective the effectiveness of the regulation of social media, 
which has allowed me to offer an original analysis, which any future effective regulation in 
this area must acknowledge, namely that the regulation of social media will always retain an 
element of reactivity to technological development. In this summary, I therefore suggest that, 
as underpinned by my doctrinal analysis, a regulatory model must be devised that can grow 
with technology, that is alive to cultural sensitivities and the organisational constraints of both 
the regulator and regulated entities. In this summary, I therefore assert that truly responsive 
social media regulation would embrace and engage with the disruptive nature of the 
environment which it seeks to assist, rather than command. This observation with regards to 
the need for future research makes an important contribution to the contemporary problem of 
the regulation of disruptive technologies as it explores and acknowledges their uniqueness. It 
has allowed me to suggest that future research in this area must explore and subsequently 
address how the law fails to take into account the way in which such technologies operate, 
and problematically viewing them through existing legal lenses, designed for legal dilemmas 
that predate Web 2.0 and do not possess the necessary fluidity. My overall work therefore 
makes a novel and significant contribution to improving the overall effectiveness and 
coherence of the body of law and policy that already exists.  
 
In this summary, I explain how the requirement for research in this area stems from the wide 
adoption of Internet enabled smart devices, which have made social media ubiquitous. Social 
media is analogous to a modern day religion that many observe devoutly on a daily basis, 
ZLWKQRWRQO\PLOOLRQVRI µFDVXDO¶ XVHUVEXWDOVR LWV YDULRXVSUHDFKHUV ILQGLQJ IRUPDVHJ
influential bloggers, and celebrity Twitter account holders) and their devoted followers. It has 
arguably been afforded a status akin to a basic human need, quenching a thirst for 
knowledge that we never knew we had. The globules of information processed via social 
media spill forth shape and carry our collective and individual identities (for example in 
relation to politics, jurisdiction, legal system, social norms, shared values, religion, history, 
culture etc.). Such valuable and private aspects of our personalities, which are some of the 
PRVW YDOXDEOH GLJLWDO µFRPPRGLWLHV¶ WKDW ZH DV KXPDQ EHLQJV SRVVHVV DUH QRZ SDVVLQJ
back and forth across the giant uncharted digital oceans that collectively represent social 
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media content generation which takes place on Web 2.0.1 A strong theme identified within 
this summary, as a result of the doctrinal analysis contained in my book, is a consideration of 
the limitations of reforming existing regulation as opposed to devising regulation that takes 
into account the very nature of social media itself. Through reflecting on my doctrinal analysis 
and considering this in light of regulatory theory, it makes important observations that must 
form part of a reform agenda that can be tested against practical outcomes. 
 
 
Why should social media be regulated? 
 
A question in this summary which I suggest must form an important part of any future 
attempts to regulate social media is whether, even if regulation is possible, it is desirable? A 
critique of governmental and legal regulatory interventions, adopting universalist free speech 
arguments2 could be advanced that such public entities have no place in responding to 
individual choices.3 Examples of speech, as explored in my book, may be undesirable (e.g. 
hate speech), but it could be argued that such is the consequence of freedom of choice.4  
 
The concept of a truly free flow of information facilitated by Web 2.0 is utopian, but this does 
not accord with the creation of the Internet, from which the environment for Web 2.0 
developed. The Internet was a public-sector creation, which only later came under private 
control. 5  Relatedly, the regulation though which proprietary, civil and criminal rights are 
conferred and defended fosters an environment in which the development of the Internet can 
exist. It has been commonly advanced that regulation is a curb on free speech, producing a 
chilling effect, but this is not the case. For example, without competition law to govern anti-
competitive practice and allow for market entrants to create platforms and products, there 
would not be a range of new products for consumers to make use of; without intellectual 
property rights platform providers could not define and defend their proprietary rights in the 
software they create, thus monetising their intellectual property. I agree with Sunstein, that 
without legal protection of any kind: 
  
µ«DOO sides would be left with the struggle to show superior force. In such an 
environment only the very strongest player would win the battle for dominance and 
with such a monopoly could curb privacy and freedom of expression if the market did 
not allow for freedom of competition. The question is not should we have regulation 
but instead, what sort of regulation should we KDYH"¶6  
 
 
                                                                 
1
 See Sauter (2014) p.824:  
µRQ)DFHERRNSHRSOHZULWH DQGXSGDWHVWDWXVPHVVDJHVQRW MXVW DV D IRUPRI FRPPXQLFDWLRQEXW DVDPHDQV RI
VKDSLQJXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIVHOIDQGHVWDEOLVKLQJQRUPDWLYHZD\VRIDFWLQJDQGVRPHWLPHVWUDQVJUHVVLQJWKHP¶ 
Social networks therefore represent a powerful new arena for developing and expressing identities (Hargittai (2007), McKenna 
and Seidman (2008), Shah (2008), Turkle (1995) or even users "inner narcissus", mesmerised by their own reflection in the 
Web 2.0 waters (Buffardi and Campbell (2008), Dalsgaard (2008) Hills (2008), Rosen (2007) Turkle (2011). Such validation 
does not depend on adherence to democracy, of course it is boosted by characteristics of liberalism and democracy, such as 
autonomy and equality but it is not necessarily dependent on it and can apply in non-liberal contexts, hence they have 
applicability beyond liberal societies. 
2
 Raz (1995). 
3
 Sunstein, 2010 p.152; Perry-Barlow. 
4
 Spar (2001) p. 9. For a recent example of how content posted online, can have future consequences for individuals see the 
resignation of Toby Young from the Office of Students for comments made in articles and via various social media outlets. 
Rawlinson, K. Toby Young Resigns from the Office for Students after Backlash, The Guardian 9 January 2018. Accessible via 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/jan/09/toby-young-resigns-office-for-students> Accessed 9 January 2018. 
5
 Sunstein (2010) p. 157. 
6
 Susnstein (2010) p.156-160. 
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What form should regulation take? 
 
The regulation of the dynamic quality of Internet content generation has been the subject of 
debate.7 Social media concentrates this dynamism into a digital vortex with its speed, reach 
and permanence.8 Social media is a Shakespearean stage of sorts where we are all merely 
players, projecting a performance artistry of what we wish the community to see. It creates 
an environment where those with views outside of the mainstream can surf the highest 
waves to troll others, effect political change and rise to become public figures (even 
President).9 1HYHU EHIRUH FRXOG D NHUQHO RI WUXWK ³DOWHUQDWLYH IDFW´ RU OLH VKDNH RXU YHU\
beliefs to the core, or even affect the course of political history.10  
 
It is little wonder therefore that in the context of the development of information technology, 
Barlow declared:  
 
µLaw adapts by continuous increments and at a pace second only to geology in its 
stateliness. Technology advances in lunging jerks, like the punctuation of biological 
evolution grotesquely accelerated. Real world conditions will continue to change at a 
blinding pace and the law will get further behind, more profoundly confused¶11 
 
%DUORZ
V µSHUPDQHQW PLVPDWFK¶ KDV HYHQ OHG VRPH VFKRODUV WR VXJJHVW WKDW WKH ,QWHUQHW
cannot be regulated. Steinert-Threlkeld sums up this conceptual position with remarkable 
EUHYLW\ µsome things never change about governing the Web. Most prominent is its innate 
DELOLW\ WR UHVLVW JRYHUQDQFH LQ DOPRVW DQ\ IRUP¶.12 However such an analysis is steeped in 
regulatory histrionics, using old paths to travel to the new. Social media facilitated by Web 
2.0 has the potential to offer vast opportunities and intrepid digital explorers have to discover 
these new frontiers before they can be shaped, described and regulated. 
 
To date, despite a focus on individualised problems associated with the regulation of social 
media, the question of its effective regulation in a holistic sense remains largely 
unaddressed. 13  7KH RULJLQDOLW\ RI WKH VXEVHTXHQW UHVHDUFK , KDYH DSSOLHG WR P\ ERRN¶V
doctrinal analysis is to query the ways in which social media has become subject to 
regulation and to ask why such existing models do not match the needs of the medium. From 
my doctrinal analysis, I have concluded that there are limitations of trying to place a dynamic, 
spontaneous and far reaching medium into existing legislation which was not designed to 
regulate it and which were originally conceptualised for much more static forms of 
                                                                 
7
 Lessig, L. 2008, Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0; Steinert-Threlkeld7 µOf Governance and Technology¶
Interactive Week Online, 2 October 1998. 
8
 Eight of the world's most popular social networks flush out an astonishing amount of content every minute and the social 
media high seas, double in size every two years. By 2020 it is estimated will reach 44 trillion Gigabytes (See 
http://www.emc.com/leadership/digital-universe/2014iview/executive-summary.htm).  
9
 For example Milo Yiannopoulos, a prominent Troll who became a Brietbart journalist as a result of his controversial postings 
online, was banned from Twitter for encouraging racist attacks on actress Leslie Jones (see Altman, J. The whole Leslie Jones 
Twitter feud, explained USA Today 25 Jul, 2016. Accessible via <http://college.usatoday.com/2016/07/25/the-whole-leslie-jones-
twitter-feud-explained/>. He was disinvited from the Conservative Political Action Conference for a remark in defense of 
relationships between µyounger boys and older PHQ¶. See Robinson, N :KDW:H¶OO7ROHUDWHDQG:KDW:H:RQ¶W Current Affairs, 
27 February 207.  Accessible via <https://www.currentaffairs.org/2017/02/what-well-tolerate-and-what-we-wont>. 
10
 Blakely, R. The Tweets, the Tantrums ± President Trump¶s First Month The Times Sunday Magazine, published 25 February 
2017. Accessible via <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-tweets-the-tantrums-the-leaks-president-trumps-first-month-
cwdd2h989>. 
11
 Perry-Barlow, J. µThe Economy of Selling Ideas¶ Selling Wine without Bottles on a Global Net¶ available at 
http://www.eff.org/EconomyOfIdeas.html. Accessed 12 July 2016. 
12
 Steinert-Threlkeld, T ³2I*RYHUQDQFHDQG7HFKQRORJ\´,QWHU#FWLYH:HHN2QOLQH2FWREHU Quoted in Lessig, L. Code 
: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0, Basic Books, 2008. ProQuest Ebook Central.  
13
 There is some work in the field of co-regulation. See Marsden, C. (2012) p. 212. However, there is as of yet no 
comprehensive attempt to address the overarching regulation of social media in a holistic manner.  
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communication, designed to regulate one-to-one communications, rather than one to many.14 
For example, in my book I explore how social media is a product of technological innovation 
and how the law operates indirectly through other modalities such as the technology itself.15 
As a result of reflecting on my doctrinal work, in this summary I suggest that social media is a 
fluid and original medium, requiring its own conceptualisation, rather than a re-
conceptualisation of existing regulation. Consequently, the context in which law operates and 
the reciprocal relationship between technology and rules must be considered in parallel when 
proposing a regulatory model suitable for the complex demands presented by social media.  
 
The detailed doctrinal analysis of aspects of social media regulation as contained in my 
book, has subsequently allowed me to explore contextually, why existing laws fail due to their 
reactionary nature. Through my doctrinal research, I have developed considerable doctrinal 
knowledge, with specific expertise on criminal and civil law matters covering defamation,16 
hate speech, offensive communications, data protection and, crucially, how the regulation of 
social media is located within existing legal frameworks which were not designed to meet the 
issues of legal novelty which they raise. My book has therefore allowed me to build on, and 
enter into a scholarly conversation about the meaning and impact of these legal 
developments, as well as their limitations in addressing the needs for regulatory reform.  
 
In addition to asking whether such a space is capable of being regulated, through reflecting 
on my doctrinal analysis, I have also considered who will or should regulate it. In the vast 
majority of circumstances, regulation is not the domain of one sovereign state, but extends to 
the world, prompting an important question as to how, common with other global issues, 
regulation can evolve within multi-level governance (state, international conventions etc.). In 
my book I undertook a comparative analysis, drawing extensively on the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights as well as, drawing on examples of social media regulation 
internationally. In particular, the book draws upon analysis, jurisprudence and scholarship 
emanating from the USA given its constitutional commitment to the protection of freedom of 
expression, in order to consider common thematic issues. For example, the First Amendment 
to the US Bill of Rights frames a strong pro-speech culture, yet the USA has also seen a rise 
in social media vigilantism, its use as a Presidential channel of communication, fake profiles 
and private entrapment. My book also considers jurisdictions which take a different approach 
to expressive rights, such as France and Germany, which restrict certain speech notably with 
regards to anti-Semitism and denial of the holocaust,17 as contracted against jurisdictions 
which are pro expression such as the USA under the First Amendment 18  as well as 
jurisdictions which take a more pro-state approach to regulation such as China and South 
Korea.19 
 
As an applied legal scholar, my research is directed towards identifying and resolving legal 
problems within the technological and commercial parameters in which they operate. My 
                                                                 
14
 Such as telephone communications, see DPP v Chambers [2012] EWHC 2157 at [27]. 
15
 See Scaife, L. (2015) Chapters 1 and 2. For a recent example see the character increase on Twitter from 140 to 280 
FKDUDFWHUV µTwitter to Expand 280-&KDUDFWHU 7ZHHWV¶  BBC News 7 November 2017, accessible via 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-41900880 Accessed 13 November 2017. 
16
 Twitter is a fast moving and often aggressive forum where the restriction to 140 characters requires users to express 
themselves in striking terms. Very often, tweets can best be categoriVHG DV µYXOJDU DEXVH¶ UDWKHU WKDQ VWDWHPHQWV RI IDFW
(see McGrath & Anor v Dawkins [2012] EWHC B3 (QB) [52]).  Harm may, therefore, be more difficult to establish in comparison 
WRD³VHULRXVPHGLDSXEOLFDWLRQ´ 
17
 See Scaife, L. (2015) France pp.72-3; Germany pp.45, 160, 319. 
18
 See Scaife, L. (2015) United States pp.44-45, 77-8, 94-95, 149, 159, 228-9, 240, 357-8, 350. 
19
 See Scaife, L. (2015) 1: China pp.2, 48, pp.160-2 Korea (South) pp.162-3; Spain pp.14, 280-4. 
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book also considers the role of policy and soft law (e.g. in the form of guidance notes that 
inform the interpretation of privacy legislation). This has allowed me to offer an analysis that 
even these innovations operate in a top-down fashion, 20  pre-supposing that top-down 
regulation is desirable, effective and determinative (i.e. that something is either the subject of 
regulation or it is not).  
 
The doctrinal analysis undertaken in my book has therefore allowed me to observe that there 
is a need for further research into developing a solution to the problem of regulating social 
media, which allows speech to flow. This has led me to raise the important question in this 
summary as to what further theoretical investigation is required into what more responsive 
fluid models could be adopted to effectively regulate social media. My overall body of work is 
cutting edge as, to date, no other scholar has comprehensively sought to consider why social 
media is a current legal problem requiring a re-conceptualisation of the regulatory 
environment seeking to govern it, as opposed to merely re-stating the legal problems the 
medium facilitates (e.g. hate speech, privacy infringement etc.) or suggesting short-term 
UHJXODWRU\µFXUHV¶WRSUREOHPVDVWKH\DULVH 
 
In this summary I suggest that, adopting the analogy of the regulation of the sea, the law 
should allow speech to flow in and out of protected areas, so that law abiding vessels which 
choose to be part of a socially responsible, respectful and self-governing system, based on 
HIIHFWLYH SULQFLSOHV DQG VWDQGDUGV FDQ VDLO WKURXJK ³KDUERXU HQWUDQFHV´ DV WKH\ ZLVK LQ
accordance with the accepted rules and conventions. The systems and regulation will 
similarly evolve over time through a process of review, whilst building up customary courses 
and standards of Internet behaviour based on underlying common principles which should be 
agreed are desirable of protection and common interest, representing collaboration between 
the legislators, developers and the community itself.  
 
A more critical, responsive and iterative approach to the regulation of expressive social 
media content is required. I suggest that what must be devised is a regulatory model that can 
grow with the technological state of the art, which is alive to cultural sensitivities and 
organisational constraints of both the regulator and regulated entities. In summary, my 
argument is that regulation can be devised which is responsive, because it knows the 
environment that it seeks to assist, rather than attempting to command it. The legislative 
modelling should consequently be alive to performance sensitivities and changes in tides. 
This summary rejects the notion that regulation is an inherently restrictive force, instead I find 
that regulation should foster a regulatory environment in which the Internet, and the web, and 
social media have the potential to flourish. 
 
 
                                                                 
20
 The Crown Prosecution Services Guidelines on Prosecuting Cases with a Social Media Element state:  
 
 µ7KHVH JXLGHOLQHV VHW RXW WKH DSSURDFK WKDW SURVHFXWRUV VKRXOG WDNH ZKHQ PDNLQJ GHFLVLRQV LQ UHODWLRQ WR FDVHV
where it is alleged that criminal offences have been committed by the sending of a communication via social media. 
The guidelines are designed to give clear advice to prosecutors who have been asked either for a charging decision 
or for early advice to the police, as well as in reviewing those cases which have been charged by the police. 
Adherence to these guidelines will ensure that there is a consistency of approaFK DFURVV WKH &36« These 
guidelines are primarily concerned with offences that may be committed by reason of the nature or content of a 
communication sent via social media. Where social media is simply used to facilitate some other substantive offence, 
prRVHFXWRUVVKRXOGSURFHHGXQGHUWKHVXEVWDQWLYHRIIHQFHLQTXHVWLRQ¶. (Emphasis added).  
 
No attention is paid to the unique nature of social media itself, presupposing that existing regulation can be applied to social 
media so long as the guidance is followed. 
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Reception of my work 
 
My published work has appeared in a number of well-respected peer reviewed 
communications journals and my primary text submitted for this PhD by publication, The 
Handbook of Social Media and the Law, published in 2015,21 has been described in peer 
review as: 
 
 ³µWKH VHPLQDO WH[W LQ WKH DUHD¶ DQG DQ µexpertly written book [which] provides an 




My recent publications have been recognised by the UK Law Commission23 as making a 
contribution to the development of a critical scholarship towards the regulation of social 
media and the potential for changes to the criminal law. I have also appeared on Channel 4 
News discussing the arguments in favour of the regulation of social media with Jon Snow.24 
Consequently, my overall work is having an impact on law reform, as well as broadening 
academic and mainstream understanding and critique of new approaches to the regulation of 





Part 1: What are social media DQGZKDWLVDµVRFLDOQHWZRUN¶" 
As explored in Part 1 of my book, there are two key conceptual shortcomings with regards to 
existing legal research relating to social media.  
 
The role of the community social media serves 
 
First, my book start by posing and exploring the question why law are ineffective in the 
existing regulatory regimes, stepping back to consider why social media is so widely 
adopted.25  
 
From this analysis, I have been able to observe how social media facilitates the sharing of 
such communications which shape and carry our collective and individual identities (for 
example politics, jurisdiction, legal system, social norms, shared values, religion, history, 
culture etc.), which are some of the most valuable digital commodities of the self that we, as 
human beings possess. The significance of this analysis is that through understanding better 
the nature and social role of social media, as DPHDQV WKURXJKZKLFK µDQH[HUFLVHRI VHOI
upon self by which one tries to work out, to transform oneself and to attain a certain mode of 
                                                                 
21
 Since the publication of this volume I have published a further work exploring the social media and terrorism, considering 
security law, privacy and human rights in further detail. Scaife, L Social Networks as the New Frontier of Terrorism: #Terror. ed./ 
Routledge, 2017. p. 164-192 (Routledge Research in Information Technology and e-Commerce Law). 
22
 Book Review, Compliance and Risk Journal, Volume 4 (2015), Issue 1, p. 15.  
23
 See Appendix 2. 
24
 Channel 4 News, Original Air date 5 January 2017 at 19:00 hrs. Accessible via <https://www.channel4.com/news/is-social-
media-promoting-violence>.  
25
 See Scaife, L. (2015) Chapters 1 and 2. 
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EHLQJ¶ 26  Acknowledging the significance of social media, in terms of modern social 
interaction and self-formation it critical if regulators and academics are to better understand 
the framework in which any proposed regulation and or policy must operate. I assert in this 
summary that WKLV LVDNH\IRXQGDWLRQVWDJHLQFRQVLGHULQJWKHODZ¶V responsiveness to the 
behaviours, attitudes and cultures of the communities, which any current or proposed 
regulation must serve. 
 
 
Presumptions regarding resistance to governance 
 
Secondly, in this summary based on my doctrinal analysis of case law, I suggest that there is 
a presumption that new technologies possess an innate ability to resist governance.27 In the 
context of social media regulation, it is useful to consider the regulation of the Internet more 
generally. The Internet was insensitive to regulation because it was designed to be so by 
those who created it.28 Therefore the failing of the existing law and the challenge for any 
proposed regulatory model, is that it must be able to adapt to the constraints of the relatable 
environment. My book therefore considers: 
 
x the nature of the development of the platforms available online; 
x the historical operational development of social media platforms; 
x how a social network is defined within existing laws; and 
x how social networking platforms operate from a technical an operational perspective.  
Through reflecting on my doctrinal research, I have observed that there is need to focus on 
the nature of the regulatable space and, then to go on to consider how architecture can be 
designed which better meets its unique demands. As part of the research I have undertaken 
post publication of my book, I have considered and agree with  Black and Baldwin, that to be 
really responsive, regulation must respond to attitudinal settings, to the broader regulatory 
environment, the different logics of regulatory tool and strategies, to the regime¶V RZQ
performance and finally to changes in each of these elements.29 A conclusion that can be 
drawn from my analysis is that regulators must bring into their regulation modelling the 





Through a consideration of my doctrinal analysis, in this summary I assert that social media 
is not ethereal, it is a manmade construct, building upon the architecture of Web 1.0.30 It also 
represents an integral part of self-discovery and a powerful medium for social interaction, 
which allows users to µfigure out how to manage their daily actions and interactions within the 
context of the complex techno-social hybrid realities they live in, constantly navigating their 
                                                                 
26
 Foucault, M. (1986). p.2. 
27
 Perry-Barlow, J. (1996), Steinert-Threlkeld (1998). 
28
 The original Internet made such regulation extremely difficult as originally deployed, as one court put it: µthe Internet is wholly 
insensitive to geographic distinctions.¶American Library Association v Pataki 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y) 1997, cited in Michael 
Geist, Cyber Law 2.0, 44 Boston College Law Review 323, 326-27 (2003).). 
29
 Black, J. and Baldwin, R. (2008) p. 69. 
30
 Scaife, L. (2015) pp. 4-7. 
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SXEOLFDSSHDUDQFHDQGWKHLUUHODWLRQWRVHOIDQGRWKHUV¶31 The question for further theoretical 
exploration therefore becomes not one of what makes a rule effective, but what makes for 
effective architecture, and creates an environment in which rules can be conceptualised, 
nurtured and formed into courses of customary behaviour.  
 
Part 2 and 3: A doctrinal analysis of why existing laws as applied to social media do 
not work 
 
Parts 2 and 3 of my book explore the limitations of locating social media within existing 
regulatory frameworks.32 As is exemplified by the doctrinal analysis contained in Chapters 3-
10, the regulation of social media content33 has so far been shoe-horned into a range of 
existing statutes.34 For example, Chapters 4±9 consider the potential for the criminalisation of 
RQOLQH SRVWLQJV DQG WKH LVVXHV WKLV SUHVHQWV LQ WHUPV RI SURWHFWLQJ LQGLYLGXDOV¶ ULJKWV WR
freedom of expression. These chapters look at each of the key statutes under which 
prosecutions can be pursued and the case law that has come before the courts to date. The 
chapters consider aggravating and mitigating factors in relation to various types of postings 
such as those inciting terrorism, those which contain distasteful content, and cases about 
jokes which have got out of control. Each chapter considers the key elements that must be 
considered in order to pursue a prosecution and looks at some of the key issues that could 
be raised in defence.  
 
Drawing upon a specific example, my books REVHUYDWLRQV LQWR WKH ODZ¶V UHVSRQVH WR
communications based offences demonstrates the limitations of determinative regulation and 
subsequent attempts to interpret it in the context of social media.35 My book, notably with 
regards to applying statutes such as the Communications Act 2003 to social media 
communications, reveals the inherent weakness of existing laws, as the context in which 
interactive social media dialogue takes place is quite different to the context in which other 
communications take place, access is ubiquitous and instantaneous. 36 Banter, jokes and 
offensive comments are commonplace and often spontaneous and communications intended 
for a few may reach millions.37  
                                                                 
31
 Sauter, T. :KDW¶VRQ\RXUPLQG":ULWLQJRQ)DFHERRNDs a tool for self-IRUPDWLRQ¶1HZ0HGLDDQG6RFLHW\9ROp. 
824. 
32
 Chapter 4: Communications Act 2003; Chapter 5: Malicious Communications Act 1988; Chapter 6: Serious Crime Act 2007; 
Chapter 7: Crime and Disorder Act 1998; Chapter 8: Public Order Act 1986; Chapter 9: Protection from Harassment Act 1997). 
Part 3 of my book deals with criminal offences Chapter 11: Contempt of Court Act 1981; Chapter 12: Evidence and Procedure. 
Part 3 of my book deals with criminal offences Chapter 11: Contempt of Court Act 1981; Chapter 12: Evidence and Procedure. 
33
 This essay considers criminal content and privacy matters. For a review of the specific laws relating to civil offences, see 
Scaife (2015) Chapter 3. 
34
 For example, in the UK cases involving criminal behaviour can be prosecuted under an umbrella of existing legislation 
including the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Malicious Communications Act 1988, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
(See R v Cryer (Unreported) 21 March 2012, Newcastle Magistrates' Court), the Public Order Act 1986 (see R v Stacey, 
Swansea Crown Court (unreported); R v Stacey, Appeal No: A20120033 30 March 2011.), the Serious Crime Act 2007 (See R v 
Blackshaw 2011] EWCA Crim 2312; R v Perry John Sutcliffe-Keenan [2011] EWCA Crim 2312; R v Ahmad Pelle, 25 August 
2011, Nottingham Crown Court (unreported); R v Hollie Bentley Unreported, Leeds Crown Court, 29 November 2011.) Doubts 
KDYH DOVR EHHQ H[SUHVVHGDV WRZKHWKHUFUHDWLQJDZHESDJH RU VRFLDOQHWZRUN JURXSFRQVWLWXWHV µVHQGLQJ¶DPHVVDJH 6HH
Policy Memorandum on the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Bill (2011) at [34], 
there are a number of examples where section 127 has been used against Internet communications). 
35
 The Communications Act 2003 is only one example of the limitations of the existing law, for further examples both civil and 
criminal; see Scaife (2015), Part II. 
36
 As Eady, J. stated in the civil case of Smith v ADVFN [2008] EWHC 1797 (QB) at [14 in relation to comments on an Internet 
EXOOHWLQ ERDUG µ« >WKH\ DUH@ OLNH FRQWULEXWLRQV WR D FDVXDO FRQYHUsation (the analogy sometimes being drawn with people 
chatting in a bar) which people simply note before moving on; they are often uninhibited, casual and ill thought out; those who 
SDUWLFLSDWHNQRZWKLVDQGH[SHFWDFHUWDLQDPRXQWRIUHSDUWHHRUµJLYHDQG WDNH¶¶ 
37
 See Scaife, L. (2015) Chapter 4. 
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Since the publication of my book, events such as the 2015 General Election38 and in May 
WKH8.¶V5HIHUHQGXPFRQFHUQLQJPHPEHUVKLSRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQDVZHOODVWKH
UKs subsequent snap-General Election, became an active vessel for voicing political 
views,39 leading to social media platforms becoming a vessel for an equivalent of political 
road rage.40 The surrounding commentary that ensued also led to a rise in reported hate 
crime.41  In the USA, the run up to the 2016 election of President Donald J Trump saw an 
increase in social media adoption as an integral part of his campaign. The blitzkrieg energy 
of the campaign trail has continued into his presidency,42 such as his use of social media 
after signing an executive order banning immigrants from seven Middle Eastern and African 
countries from the US for 90 days.43 Such Tweets, data leaks and accusations regarding 
Russian spying led to broadcast and social media speculation, as well as the coining of the 
SKUDVH³IDNHQHZV´4445 More recently political discourse traded between US President Trump 
DQG1RUWK.RUHD¶V3UHVLGHQW.LP-RQJ-Un, via social media has also led to significant social 
and broadcast media coverage, with regards to national security and who of the two has a 
bigger nuclear button.46 )XUWKHU WR WKH SXEOLFDWLRQ RI D µ)LUH DQG )XU\¶ a book written by 
Michael Wolff about President Trump, the Commander in Chief took to social media to 
defend his worthiness to sit in office.47  
 
It could be argued that such consequences are a risk of engaging with the medium, when 
one choses to submit information to the public realm. However, other examples explored in 
my book, such as contempt of court, incitement to riot during the 2012 London Riots, football 
hooliganism and racist speech highlight that the content played out on social media fall 
squarely within the remit of the criminal law.48 )RULQVWDQFHWKHDPRXQWRIQHJDWLYH³trolling´
aimed at high profile figures, including female UK Members of Parliament49 and high profile 
                                                                 
38
 See Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB)). 
39Polonski, V. 6RFLDO0HGLD9RLFHV LQ WKH8.¶V (85HIHUHQGXP Accessible via <https://medium.com/@slavacm/social-media-
voices-in-the-uks-eu-referendum-brexit-or-bremain-what-does-the-Internet-say-about-ebbd7b27cf0f#.gg68vebd0>.  
40
 Cosslett, R. )DPLO\ULIWVRYHU%UH[LWµ,FDQEDUHO\ORRNDWP\SDUHQWV¶ The Independent, published 27 June 2016. Accessible 
via https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/jun/27/brexit-family-rifts-parents-referendum-conflict-betrayal,  Accessed 12 
June 2016.; Wood, A. 52% Blamed EU for their Problems, Blame Social Media for Yours The Memo published 29 June 2016h 
Accessible via <ttp://www.thememo.com/2016/06/29/brexit-social-media-eu-half-blamed-the-eu-for-their-problems-blame-social-
media-for-yours/.> Accessed 12 June 2016. 
41
 York, C. Post-Brexit Racism Documented on Social Media published 2 July 2016 The Huffington Post. Accessible via 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/post-brexit-racism_uk_5777be69e4b073366f0f1d06> accessed 5 July 2016. Examples 
of the postings can be viewed in a )DFHERRN$OEXPHQWLWOHG µ:RUU\LQJ6LJQV¶FUHDWHGWRGRFXPHQWDOOHJHG LQFLGHQWV LQZKLFK
people have been targeted with xenophobic comments, accessible via 
<https://www.facebook.com/sarah.leblanc.718/media_set?set=a.10101369198638985&type=3&pnref=story>. 
42
 Tweets accessible via @realDonaldTrump. 
43
 Blakely, R. The Tweets, the Tantrums ± 3UHVLGHQW7UXPS¶V)LUVW0RQWK The Times, published 25 February 2017. Accessible 
via <http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-tweets-the-tantrums-the-leaks-president-trumps-first-month-cwdd2h989>. Accessed 
26 February 2017. 
44
 7KH 7ZHHWV #UHDO'RQDOG7UXPS ³,QWHOOLJHQFH DJHQFLHVVKRXOGQHYHU KDYHDOORZHG WKLV IDNHQHZV WR µOHDN¶ LQWR WKHSXEOLF
2QHODVWVKRWDWPH$UHZHOLYLQJLQ1D]L*HUPDQ\"´ 
45
 For example see an interview cited in Rifkind, Hugo The Truth (sort of) about Fake News: America's NBC News, for example, 
aired an interview with an 18-year-old called Dimitri (not his real name), who boasted he had made more than $60,000 in six 
months by creating stories for fake news websites that looked like real websites. His headlines, we learnt, LQFOXGHG ³2EDPD
,OOHJDOO\ 7UDQVIHUUHG '2- 0RQH\ WR &OLQWRQ &DPSDLJQ´ DQG ³%5($.,1* 2EDPD &RQILUPV 5HIXVDO WR /HDYH :KLWH +RXVH
$QQRXQFHV6,&.3ODQWR6WD\ LQ3RZHU´7KHDUWLFOHZDVWLPHVRQ)DFHERRN$XWKRU-RKQ(DJDQFRPPHQWHGRI WKH




 µTrump Tweet on Nuclear Button keeps North Korea's Kim 'on his toes' Reuters, 7 January 2018. Accessible via 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-usa/trump-tweet-on-nuclear-button-keeps-north-koreas-kim-on-his-
toes-haley-idUSKBN1EW0PS>. Accessed 7 January 2018. 
47
 See Wulfsohn, J. 7ZLWWHU ([SORGHV 2YHU7UXPS¶V /DWHVW µ6ORSS\ 6WHYH¶ 7ZHHW µ%DFNERDUG-Shattering¶ Mediaite 6 January 
2018. Accessible via <https://www.mediaite.com/online/twitter-explodes-over-trumps-latest-sloppy-steve-tweet-backboard-
shattering/> 
48
 Scaife, L. (2015) pp.177, 182. 
49
 See Scaife, L. (2015) pp.147-150. 
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feminist campaigners50 has led to the formation of the Reclaim the Internet Campaign51 and 
discussions as to what extent the reform of the legislation relating to harassment need to be 
addressed.52 Recently the Crown Prosecution Service released figures, which show that 
there were 4,908 reports in which Facebook and Twitter were a factor in reported crimes, 
compared with 556 in 2008.53 In the March 2017 case of Jack Monroe v Katie Hopkins54 in 
response to submissions made to the court that Twitter is a µZLOGZHVW¶55 Mark Lewis, Jack 
0RQURH¶V VROLFLWRU FRPPHQWHG µ+RSNLQVFODLPHG WKDW 7ZLWWHUZDV MXVW WKHZLOGZHVWZKHUH
anything goes. The Judge has shown that there is no such thing as a Twitter outlaw¶56 Whilst 
an important judgment, iterating that social media is not beyond the reach of regulation, yet 
again the courts compared social media to the laws of the land, when it is far more diverse 
and fluid, like the sea.  
 
As exemplified in my book though my doctrinal analysis of the Communications Act 2003, I 
assert in this summary that in adopting forms of top down regulation, and applying them to 
newly charted worlds by reference to the comfort of the familiar, there is an inherent danger 
that only some features of the event become the focus of the rule. In my view, these features 
DUHWKHQµprojected onto future events, beyond the particulars which served as the paradigm 
or archetype for the formation of the generalisation¶.57 In this summary I draw upon the work 
of Black, who observes that one of the problems associated with the creation of rules in any 
FRQWH[W DUH µtheir tendency to over or under inclusiveness, their indeterminacy, and their 
interpretation¶58 She observes that many of the issues associated with effective regulation 
VWHPVIURPWKHSUHVFULSWLYHQDWXUHRI UXOHVDV µanticipatory, generalised abstractions¶ZKLFK
ZKHQ µendowed with legal status are distinctive, authoritative forms of communication¶ $
recent example (which postdates the publication of my book) of the laws reactivity to public 
and policy pressures59 is the criminalisation of revenge porn under the amended section 63 
of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008,60 which has a specific amendment dealing 
with such actions. Offenders face up to two years in jail. The amendment covers images sent 
on social networks, including Facebook and Twitter, and those sent by text. Yet revenge porn 
is not new and currently, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) prosecutes cases around 
                                                                 
50





 Scaife, L. (2015) p.182. 
53
 Crown Prosecution Service Violence against Women and Girls Crime Report 2015-2016. Accessible via < 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/cps_vawg_report_2016.pdf>. Accessed 12 February 2017. It is debatable whether the 
number of crimes has increased, or if the crimes are now reported with greater frequency. 
54
 [2017] EWHC 433 (QB). 
55
 [2017] EWHC 433 (QB) at [71(3)]:  
 
³The credibility of the publisher in the eyes of publishees. This is clearly a relevant question. Skillfully treading a 
VRPHZKDWGHOLFDWHOLQH0U3ULFHVXEPLWVWKDW7ZLWWHULVWKH³:LOG:HVW´RIVRFLDOPHGLDDQGQRWDVDXWKRULWDWLYHDV
(for instance) The Sun or the Daily Mail, which are established institutions, subject to regulation, that employ lawyers 
to check copy. On the facts of this case, I do not find this submission persuasive. I shall come to the question of 
whether Ms. Hopkins¶PLVWDNHZDVRUZRXOGKDYHEHHQREYLRXVWRDOO%XWWKHUHLVQRJRRGUHDVRQWRFRQFOXGHWKDWD
reader would discount the allegation because of who Ms. Hopkins is, or the fact that she published on Twitter. She is 
a well-known figure. She made clear at the WLPHVKHZDVD6XQFROXPQLVW´ 
56




 Black, J. Rules and Regulators, Print publication date: 1997, Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2012 p. 8. 
58
 Black, J. (2012) p.6. The jurisprudential literature on rules is extensive. For legal analyses of rules see in particular Schauer, 
F. (1991); Twining and Miers (1991); Hart and Sacks (1958). 
59
 Criminal Justice and Courts Bill: Extension of the offence of Extreme Pornography (Possession of Pornographic Images of 
Rape and Assault by Penetration) Accessible via 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/322160/fact-sheet-extreme-porn.pdf> Accessed 
17 September 2017. 
60
 6FRWODQG¶Vextreme pornography offence (at section 51A of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982) already captures such 
material.  
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revenge porn using a range of existing laws.61 Such legislation demonstrates the on-going 
reactiveness to the law, cementing the nature of regulation as trapped in a cycle of reacting 
to an event, which initiates campaigns to change the law, and then legislation occurs rather 
than looking at the issue from the base. 
In this summary, I suggest that this creates a risk of under/over inclusiveness; regard to 
matters that may be irrelevant and leads to a risk those future developments may make the 
rule less relevant. 62  Such an approach therefore negleFWV µJRLQJ EDFN WR EDVLFV¶ WR
understand:  
µthe nature of the instrument which is being used, the properties of rules and their 
inherent limitations, and to see whether we can gain insights from this analysis which 
would enable us to make better use of rules as a regulatory technique¶63  
Thus, in this summary I agree with Schauer that µHYHQ UXOHV WKDW VHHP QRZ WREH QHLWKHU
under-or over-inclusive with respect to their background justifications retain the prospect of 
becoming so¶64 Black suggests that this can be achieved in three ways: firstly though a 
better appreciation and use of different types of rules, secondly an understanding of the 
context in which rules operate and finally considering these issues with reference to the 
nature of the regulatory community and the style of regulation adopted.65 
My book supports this analysis as my doctrinal research reveals that regulators as well as 
judges involved with the development of common law principles66 have sought to finesse the 
application of existing statutes to the regulation of social media. Such innovations still 
operate in a top-down fashion,67 pre-supposing that such a methodology is desirable and that 
it can lead to effective and determinative outcomes. 68 My research confirms the abstract 
                                                                 
61
 Sending explicit or nude images of this kind may, depending on the circumstances, be an offence under the Communications 
Act 2003 or the Malicious Communications Act 1988. Behaviour of this kind, if repeated, may also amount to an offence of 
harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.  See Revenge Porn: the facts A new criminal offence to tackle 
Revenge Porn is being introduced in England & Wales as part of the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill Revenge Porn Factsheet: 
Be Aware b4 you Share. Accessible via Gov.ukhttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/.../revenge-porn-factsheet.pdf 
Accessed 12 February 2017.  
62
 %ODFN-SQRWHV µ7KDW WKLVPLVPDWFKFDQRFFXU IRU WKUHHUHDVRQV)LUVW WKHJHQHUDOLVDWLRQZKLFK LV WKHRSHUDWLYH  
basis of the rule inevitably suppresses properties that may subsequently be relevant or includes properties that may in some 
cases be irrelevant. Secondly, the causal relationship between the event and the harm/goal is likely to be only an approximate 
one: the generalisation bears simply a probable relationship to the harm sought to be avoided or goal sought to be achieved. 
Thirdly, even if a perfect causal match between the generalisation and the aim of the rule could be achieved, future events may 
develop in suFKDZD\WKDWLWFHDVHVWREHVR¶ 
63
 Black, J. (2012) p.8. 
64
 Schauer, F. (1991) p. 35. 
65
 Black, J. (2012) pp.8-10. 
66
 See Scaife, L. (2015) Chapter 4. See also footnote 42, and footnote 26. 
67
 7KH&36*XLGHOLQHVVWDWH µ7KHVH JXLGHOLQHVVHW RXW WKH DSSURDFK WKDW SURVHFXWRUVVKRXOG WDNHZKHQPDNLQJ GHFLVLRQV LQ
relation to cases where it is alleged that criminal offences have been committed by the sending of a communication via social  
media. The guidelines are designed to give clear advice to prosecutors who have been asked either for a charging decision or 
for early advice to the police, as well as in reviewing those cases which have been charged by the police. Adherence to these 
guidelines will ensure that there is a consistency of approach across the CPS. These guidelines are primarily concerned with 
offences that may be committed by reason of the nature or content of a communication sent via social media. Where social 
media is simply used to facilitate some other substantive offence, prosecutors should proceed under the substantive offence in 
question. (Emphasis added). As can be seen from the introductory text, no attention is paid to the unique nature of social media 
itself, presupposing that existing regulation can be applied to social media so long as the guidance is followed. See Scaife, L. 
(2015) pages 139-152 for a discussion of the guidelines and pages 153-155 for a discussion of the weaknesses of the 
guidelines and how they could be refined. 
68
 7KH&36
 µ*XLGHOLQHVRQ3URVHFXWLQJ&DVHV,QYROYLQJ&RPPXQLFDWLRQV6HQWYLD6RFLDO0HGLD¶ also remind prosecutors that 
under the Malicious Communication Act 1988 and CA 2003 the law only applies to communications of a grossly offensive 
nature. Reiterating the findings of the court in DPP v Chambers, the CPS state that this meant that a communication has to be 
more than simply offensive to be contrary to the criminal law. Just because the content expressed in the communication is in 
bad taste, controversial or unpopular, and may cause offence to individuals or a specific community, this is not in itself sufficient 
reason to engage the criminal law. As Lord Bingham made clear in DPP v Collins there can be no yardstick of gross 
RIIHQVLYHQHVVµRWKHUZLVHWhan by the application of reasonably enlightened, but not perfectionist, contemporary standards to the 
SDUWLFXODUPHVVDJHVHQW LQ LWVSDUWLFXODUFRQWH[W¶ >@8.+/DW >@ ,W LVVXJJHVWHGWKDW WKH&RXUWV OLNHWKHLU6WUDVEourg 
counterparts need to demonstrate a willingness to take into account the experience of the speaker e.g. an established 
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regulatory theory proposition that regulation continues to fail at the policy and/or the 
conceptual; the practical, and the principles based levels. In essence the summation of the 
critique set out in this summary is that existing laws presuppose top down regulation is 
possible, that escalation and de-escalation is possible and that the regulated will submit to 
regulation.  
With regards to social media specifically, I assert in this summary that such an approach is 
not consistent with the way in which innovative technologies or the people who use them 
succumb to regulation. According to Spar, innovative technology (e.g. the compass, the 
SULQWLQJ SUHVV JR WKURXJK D IRXU SKDVH F\FOH RI LQQRYDWLRQ FRPPHUFLDOLVDWLRQ µFUHDWLYH
DQDUFK\¶ DQG ILQDOO\ UXOHV 69  7KH µUXOHV¶ phase sees the entry of the regulator into the 
marketplace and the technologies absorption within the traditional regulatory framework, so 
that what is seemingly ungovernable, is brought under control (much like the regulation of the 
high seas, the control of airspace etc.). Social media however, has a further angle to 




Through my subsequent reflection on my doctrinal analysis, in this summary I offer a critique 
that the H[LVWLQJODZ¶VDWWHPSWVWRUHJXODWHVRFLDOPHGLDGRHVQRWHQJDJHZLWKWKHGHPDQGV
of the particular regulatory challenges it is seeking to address.70 Approaching the regulation 
of emerging technology in a top-down, determinative manner is not a satisfactory starting 
point for the regulation of social media, or creating effective regulation more generally. Such 
an approach seeks to herd certain behaviours and/or attributes, to build up a category and/or 
definition, which then form a basic rule.71 The shortcoming of such an approach is that the 
basic rule is subsequently used as a net that is cast over a wide variety of circumstances, 
which it was not designed to accommodate. The fluidity of social media means that such 
modeling will never effectively serve nor effectively meet the unique challenges of the very 
medium, which it is seeking to regulate. 
 
 
Part 4- Changes in Approach to Regulation and Commercial settings 
 
Part 4 of my book explores the laws responsiveness to institutional environments and 
progressive regulation. According to Black and Baldwin, to be really responsive, regulation 
must respond to attitudinal settings, to the broader regulatory environment, the different 
logics of regulatory tool and strategies, to the regimes own performance and finally to 
changes in each of these elements.72 As a result of considering Part 4 of my book, I assert in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
broadcaster will be held to a higher standard than a member of the public (R (Gaunt) v Office of Communications 2010] EWHC 
1756 (QB), [2011] ACD 17, [2010] HRLR 31, [2011] 1 WLR 663) which is not something which is considered in the CPS 
guidelines. 
69
 Spar, D. Ruling the Waves Harvest Books; Reprint edition (2003) p. 8. 
70
 How laws may be more effectively designed to meet the particular regulatory challenge they seek to address has been the 
subject matter of extensive debate (Black, J. (2012); Baldwin, R. (1990)). The test of the success of regulation is whether it 
PHHWVWKHFKDOOHQJHVIDFHGE\WRGD\¶VUHJXODWRUV%ODFN-DQG%DOGZLQ5S%ODFN-and Baldwin, R. posit that for 
UHJXODWLRQWREHHIIHFWLYHµUHJXODWRUVKDYHWREHUHVSRQVLYHQRWRQO\WRWKHFRPSOLDQFHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHUHJXODWHG«RSHUDW ive 
and cognitive frameworks; their attitudinal settings; to the broader institutional environment of regulatory regime; to the different 
ORJLFVRI UHJXODWRU\ WRROVDQGVWUDWHJLHV WR WKH UHJLPHVRZQSHUIRUPDQFHDQG ILQDOO\ WRFKDQJHV LQHDFKRI WKHVH HOHPHQWV¶
(Black, J. and Baldwin, R. (2008) p.61). 
71
 Black, J. (1997) p.7 notes that rules are linguistLFLQQDWXUHDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\µKRZZHXQGHUVWDQGLQWHUSUHWDQGDSSO\UXOHV
GHSHQGVLQSDUWRQKRZZHXQGHUVWDQGDQGLQWHUSUHWODQJXDJH¶  
72
 Black, J. and Baldwin, R. (2008) p. 69. 
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this summary that the destiny of regulation and technology are intertwined. Therefore in my 
YLHZUXOHVFDQQRWDSSO\WKHPVHOYHVµfor the rule to be applied in a way which will further the 
overall aims of the rule maker, then the person applying it has to share the rule maker's 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRILW¶73 Quite simply, the tools that deliver the operational capabilities of social 
media sites, inform the form of the regulation.74 I suggest in this summary that my doctrinal 
work highlights challenges to devising responsive regulation.  
 
In Chapter 13 of my book, concerned with data privacy, I consider how there is increasing 
pan-European regulation currently being drafted that affects the private sector. Such 
regulation is drafted on a high-level principles basis which devolves its implementation to 
those regulated providers who have the capability to deliver technical solutions on a pan-
European basis, with extra-territoriality provisions. In particular, my book considers the 
European General Data Protection Regulation 2018,75 which seeks to regulate Information 
Society Services 76  at a conceptual level, 77  placing the onus on developers to design 
appropriate privacy tools by reference to the state of the art in technology that can deliver 
legally compliant solutions.78  
 
In this regard, as a result of the doctrinal analysis I have undertaken, I have subsequently 
observed that scholars must engage with the proposition that technology can be used as a 
PHDQVRIµQXGJLQJFRPSOLDQFH¶79 founded on the principle that while we behave irrationally, 
our irrationality can be corrected ± if only the environment acts upon us, nudging us towards 
the right option.80  
 
 
                                                                 
73
 Black, J. (2012) p. 218. 
74
 Lessig, L (2008), posited that regulation is not the sole product of law, but also market and social norms and is consequently 
more concerned with high level choice values and democracy. The law does not therefore operate directly, but also indirectly 
through other modalities such as the technology LWVHOI LQ RUGHU WR µUHJXODWH WR ODZV RZQ HQG¶ OHDGLQJ WR GLUHFW DQG LQGLUHFW
regulatory effects (Lessig, 2008, Ch. 4 and 5).  Therefore law can in principle regulate the architecture, and the architecture can 
regulate the norms, thereby avoiding a situatiRQZKHUHE\GHWDLOHGUXOHVDUHFUHDWHGZKLFKIRVWHUDVHQVHRI µGLVWUXVW¶EHWZHHQ
the rule maker and its subject (Black (2012) p. 217). Marsden, C. notes that the developer community has traditionally placed 
great store in self-regulation based upon codes of practice, contractual terms and community standards (Marsden 2012) with 
0DUVGHQFRQWHQGLQJWKDWµJRYHUQPHQWVKDYHEURDGO\DFFHSWHGWKDWDPRUHIOH[LEOHDQGLQQRYDWLRQ-friendly model of regulation is 
required, particularly in view of the rapid growth, complex inter-UHODWLRQVKLSVDQGG\QDPLFFKDQJHVWDNLQJSODFHLQ>WKH@,QWHUQHW¶
(Marsden (2012) p. 212).74 Consequently, given Black's observations regarding the context in which law operates and the 
reciprocal relationship between technology and rules, they must be considered in parallel when proposing a regulatory model 
suitable for the complex demands presented by social media74 so that a form of regulation can be adopted which can adapt to 
meet new challenges where non-compliance is concealed and/or new methods of evading detection are devised so that the 
µJDSEHWZHHQUXOHVDQGREMHFWLYHV¶GRHVQRWEHFRPHWRRZLGH%ODFNDQG%DOGZLQS 
75
 General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679/EU. 
76
 This includes social media sites; see Scaife L. 2014 p. 16-18. 
77
 Article 25 of the GDPR states: that data controllers must take into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation and 
the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for rights and 
freedoms of natural persons posed by the processing, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, such as 
pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective 
manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of the GDPR and 
protect the rights of data subjects. 
78
 5HFLWDORIWKH*'35VWDWHVµWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHULJKWVDQGIUHHGRPVRIQDWXUDOSHUVRQVZLWKUHJDUGWo the processing of 
personal data require that appropriate technical and organisational measures be taken to ensure that the requirements of this 
Regulation are met. In order to be able to demonstrate compliance with this Regulation, the controller should adopt internal 
policies and implement measures, which meet in particular the principles of data protection by design and data protection by 
GHIDXOW«:KHQGHYHORSLQJGHVLJQLQJVHOHFWLQJDQGXVLQJDSSOLFDWLRQVVHUYLFHVDQGSURGXFWVWKDWDUHEDVHGRQWKHSrocessing 
of personal data or process personal data to fulfil their task, producers of the products, services and applications should be 
encouraged to take into account the right to data protection when developing and designing such products, services and 
applications and, with due regard to the state of the art, to make sure that controllers and processors are able to fulfil their data 
protection obligations. The principles of data protection by design and by default should also be taken into consideration in the 
FRQWH[WRISXEOLFWHQGHUV¶ 
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 Sunstein, R Flexibility. Regulation: Looking Backward, Looking Forward Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs Administrative Law Section, American Bar Association Capital Hilton, Washington, DC, May 10, 2012. 
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 There is a note of caution, such systems are often designed by giving notice and choice to customers, which for Lessig can 
OHDG WR D VLWXDWLRQ E\ ZKLFK µcode becomes a means by which to transfer decisions from the public realm to the privatised 
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The significance and originality of my overall body of work as expressed in this summary lies 
in its holistic coverage of doctrinal understanding and its corresponding assessment and in 
this summary I offer a critique of the effectiveness of the regulation of social media as a 
ZKROHQRWDEO\WKHODFNRIIRFXVRQWKHODZ¶VIDLOXUHWRUHVSRQGWRWKHG\QDPLFDQGLWHUDWLYH
nature of social media.  
 
Areas for further theoretical re-engagement 
 
Having represented clients as a practicing lawyer and undertaken research in this area for 
the past few years, notably publishing the Handbook of Social Media and the Law, my 
research has allowed me to identify the following areas for further theoretical re-engagement 
as to how the law could be effectively reformed: 
 
(i) As noted in DPP v McConnell µthe statutes are widely drafted designed: 
(a) primarily to regulate one to one communications rather than one to many; and 
(b) to safeguard a public utility built with public money, which is now being applied to 
a privately owned, publicly accessed, many to many domain¶81 Consequently the 
current law does not take into account the spontaneity, permanence and reach of 
such communications. 
(ii) The context in which interactive social media dialogue takes place is quite different 
to the context in which other communications take place, access is ubiquitous and 
instantaneous. Banter, jokes and offensive comments are commonplace and often 
spontaneous and communications intended for a few may reach millions. 
(iii) The umbrella of legislation under which online communications are regulated, 
operate in a top-down fashion, pre-supposing that such a methodology is desirable 
and can lead to effective and determinative outcomes. 
(iv) In adopting forms of top down regulation, and applying them to newly charted 
worlds by reference to the comfort of the familiar, there is an inherent danger that 
only some features of the event become the focus of WKHUXOHDQGµare then projected 
onto future events, beyond the particulars which served as the paradigm or archetype 
for the formation of the generalisation¶82 
(v) The public lack a clear understanding as to when civil and criminal offences online 
may be committed. For the rule to be applied in a way which will further the overall 
aims of the rule maker, then the person applying it has to share the rule maker's 
interpretation of it.83 
(vi) Insufficient attention is paid to the role of the regulated84 and the role of online 
writing as a process of self-formation. 
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YLLL 7KH UROH RI WKH SODWIRUP SURYLGHUV¶ OLDELOLW\ DQG DELOLW\ WR FUHDWH WHFKQRORJLFDOO\
effective system architecture needs further analysis.85  
(ix) With regard to policy more generally, this would represent a unique opportunity to 
move from a policy centred analysis handed down for implementation, to a more 
action centred approach to regulatory reform. 
In summation, the conclusions reached from considering regulatory theory as applied to my 
doctrinal analysis, supports the proposition that existing laws cannot be applied or adapted to 
the social media context. Social media poses new problems, requiring new solutions 
including a consideration of the role of co-regulation. My research reveals that this area of 
legal regulation is in need of further attention with regards to its successful reform. In this 
regard it also raises an important question, namely how can responsive regulation be created 
that is sensitive to the behaviour, attitude and culture of the communities which regulation 
must serve? I now turn to consider this issue as applied to my analogy of the regulation of 
the sea. 
 
The Regulatory Harbour Model- An Iterative and Dynamic Model for the Regulation of 
Social Media 
 
Much like the Internet, social media as a current legal problem is frequently characterised as 
somehow unique, differing from other seemingly untameable spaces, such as the sea. 
 
This is not a satisfactory starting point, given that social media is not unique in its objects 
and/or events which form the subject matter of regulation, being dynamic and fluid in nature. 
For example in essence, until the rise of modern nations, maritime law did not derive its force 
from territorial sovereigns; instead it represented what was already conceived to be the 
customary law of the sea. As commerce moved northward and westward, sea codes 
developed in northern European ports, with important medieval sea codes such as the Laws 
of Wisby (a Baltic port), the Laws of Hansa Towns (a Germanic league), and the Laws of 
Oleron (a French island) being developed. These codes each drew inspiration form the 
Consolato del Mare, notably the Laws of Oleron, the second great code of maritime 
regulation. These codes are revered as the three arches upon which rests modern admiralty 
structure (the "Three Arches"). According to one historian, the great value of the rules which 
had been developed for maritime trade lay in the fact that they had been "found by practice 
to be suitable to the needs of a community which knows no national boundaries ±the 
international community of seafarers".86  The challenge therefore is to find a model suitable 
for such a dynamic environment whose attempts to impose a degree of artifice, works 
organically with social medias unique nature, rather than to impose rigid construct. The goal 
should be to find a way to marry social PHGLD¶V naturalistic, metonymic nature, with the rules 
and architecture so that whilst the rules may remain the "organising centre", they 
complement the seascape. Rules should not be an edifice whose very infringement of the 
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environment makes them vulnerable.  Regulation can be created for anything. Tomorrow, 
legislators could ban social media in its entirety if they so wished. However, the test of 
regulation is whether it is equipped to meet the demands of the legal dilemmas which it 
raises and whether those persons subject to regulation, submit to it. Improved rule-making 
comes when the means of securing compliance is shaped having regard to the particular 
problem at hand, rather than by "clinging to the notion that rules shape the world" (Baldwin, 
1990 p.337). 
 
The great value of the rules which had been developed for maritime trade lay in the fact that 
they had been found by practice to be suitable to the needs of a community which knows no 
national boundaries. Just like the Law of the Sea and of the Consolato del Mare, which 
represented compilations of comprehensive rules for all maritime subjects, covering 
everything from ownership of vessels, the duties and responsibilities of the Master Mariners 
or Captains thereof, duties of seamen and their wages, freight, salvage, jettison, average 
contribution, and the like, enjoying an authority far beyond the port from which it hailed. 
Similarly a principle based approach needs to be adopted to the regulation of social media 
which facilitates an environment in which law, users and technology can work together to 
create a co-regulated principles based space, which has the necessary flexibility to adapt to 
the development of technology, whilst respecting core principles of human rights. Taking 
these principles as a base, international regulation can be developed which has the 
necessary flexibility to take into account the state of the art and sustain a rigorous regulatory 
environment, with better and more effective outcome focussed approach despite being 
applied, rather than artificially seeking to apply detailed rules prescribing how outcomes must 
be achieved. 87  This will facilitate the creation of an ecosystem by which the regulatory 
environment can adapt, based on performance assessments and consequently modifications 
to the approach adopted (Black and Baldwin (2012) p.140). A diagrammatic representation of 




the principles envisaged which must be designed and/or drafted into the vision for regulation. 
At this point regulation can be drafted that is sufficiently broad to protect principles, by 
reference to the state of the art of technology, backed by civil and/or criminal, sanctions. 
 
Engagement with the technological community may of course lead to concerns that solutions 
are inconsistent and that there is a lack of transparency in decision-making as well as costs 
for state regulators in terms of creating continuity. It is suggested that to counter this risk and 
WR IRVWHU D FRQVLVWHQW DSSURDFK WR UHJXODWLRQ µSHHU SDQHOV¶88 comprised of the main social 
media platform providers and policy makers could be adopted to foster the development of 
common language about risk and to facilitate learning. 89  Whilst such panels could be 
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criticised on the basis that they lack impartiality (akin to the Press Complaints Commission) 
exerts and those concerned with the issues at hand can always be brought into the model. 
Failure to consult the technology providers however would not be consistent with the highly 
technical and operationally driven nature of the technologies seeking to be regulated. The 
VROXWLRQ FDQ WKHQ EH ILQHVVHG WR EDODQFH WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V SULRULWLHV DQG KXPDQ ULJKWV
obligations and understand industries risk (such as cost, complexity of delivery etc.) in order 
to resolve the construction, deployment and operation of the proposed model. The roadmap 
can then be broken down into a series of releases, with the high overarching architectural 
requirements taking precedence over the successive iterations of the technological solutions 
used to achieve the overall legal principle. When regulation is approached in this manner the 
model adopted can take into account the institutional environments in which the regulators 
act,90 whilst factoring the view of the regulated, without having the need to resort to a radical 
re-model of the regulatory approach which would not have the necessary flexibility to take 
into account he degree of institutionalism that is present in regulation and which cannot be 
easily divested. The goal should be iterative evolution not prescriptive arbitrary revolution. 
 
Whilst such modelling may be viewed as eclectic and broad, with regards to enforcement 
and compliance, my research serves to demonstrate that there are several ways in which to 
achieve the overall principles that are deemed worthy of protection, each naturally has its 
own strengths and weaknesses. The approach taken towards regulation will naturally vary 
according to context. Similar to theoretical approaches adopted with regards to really 
responsive regulation,91 the model and underlying analysis put forward in this paper goes 
beyond prescriptive approaches so as to offer the regulator and the regulate a framework for 
evaluating the relative merit of different approaches and players involvement and allows for 
the adoption of innovative combinations of regulatory logic, allowing optimal responses to be 
developed by the whole community, with the scope for feedback by each player in the 
community. In this regard, it goes further than simply providing a refinement of existing 
models, demanding an on-going consideration of the regulatory strategy to be adopted, 
beginning with principles and problems rather than the regulation itself. The regulation is 
responsive because it knows the environment, which it seeks to assist, rather than 













                                                                                                                                                                                                           
emphasis on, different under-standings of the nature of behaviours or an institutional environment, and in turn have different 
pre-conditions for effectiveness (namely that the institutional environment of behaviours conforms to those foundational 
understandings¶ 
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